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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING BELOW 
This case involves an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's ruling on a Motion 
for Order of Immediate Occupancy granting Provo City extraterritorial powers of 
condemnation under Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution. 
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(k) Utah Code Ann.. Rule 
5 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this Court's Order of January 13, 2003, granting 
the Petition for Permission to appeal the interlocutory order of the Fourth District Court. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err in ruling that Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution 
grants Provo City extraterritorial condemnation powers in order to construct a public road, 
through property not within its municipal boundaries and does Article XI, § 5(c) limit Provo 
City's condemnation powers for the purpose of road construction to lands located within its 
municipal boundaries? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The present case involves the trial court's conclusion of law ruling on Provo City's 
Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy granting Provo City extraterritorial powers of 
condemnation under Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution. The proper standard of 
review of a trial court's decision of law is correctness. See Bearden v. Croft, 31 P.3d 537, 
538 (Utah2001). Accordingly, the trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no deference 
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and are reviewed for correctness. Id. Correctness is also the standard of review for questions 
of statutory interpretation. Id. 
Spring Canyon raised the issue of Provo City's lack of authority to condemn the 
property at issue in its Answer, Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy, Answer to Amended Complaint, and its Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff s Amended Motion for Immediate Occupancy. (Rec.Pg. 82,134,214, and316). 
The issue also represents the core of the trial court's ruling. (See Ruling on Motion For 
Order of Immediate Occupancy f 6, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; Rec. Pg. 334). As such, 
this issue was preserved in the trial court for review. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
This appeal involves the interpretation of the scope of Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah 
Constitution and the limitation placed on that provision by Article XI, § 5(c) of the Utah 
Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves Provo City's attempt to condemn land located outside its municipal 
boundaries. The trial court ruled that Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution grants Provo 
City extraterritorial condemnation powers in order to construct a public road and granted 
Provo City's Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy. Defendant appeals. 
Defendant asks this Court to review and reverse the trial court's ruling that Article XI 
§ 5(b) of the Utah Constitution grants Provo City extraterritorial condemnation powers in 
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order to construct a public road and hold that Article XI § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution limits 
Provo City's Power of eminent domain to an area within its municipal boundaries. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellants, Kay J. Ivie, Devon R. Ivie, Kristine J. Lee, Edward R. Lee, and 
Spring Canyon Limited Partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "Spring Canyon"), as owners 
of the land at issue, seek to protect Iheir property rights from an abuse of Provo City's 
eminent domain power. Spring Canyon's property is not located within the corporate 
boundaries of Provo City. (See Map of Provo City, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; Rec. Pg. 
116). Spring Canyon's property is a part of an island, surrounded by Provo City.(See Map 
of Provo City, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; see also Street Map of Provo, attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C;" Rec. Pg. 25 and 119). Spring Canyon's property is located on the benchland 
approximately 100 feet above the road to which Provo City intends to connect the proposed 
road. 
This island was created by Provo City by annexing in a manner so as to surround 
Spring Canyon's property. Provo City now claims that it is necessary to condemn Spring 
Canyon's property in order to connect two roads. The Canyon Road on the benchland with 
University Avenue at 4800 North in the riverbottoms. This problem, however, was created 
by the city's own annexation actions. Regardless of this fact, Provo City is attempting to 
exercise extra-territorial condemnation power, power that neither the constitution nor the 
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legislature has granted to the city, in an effort to take the land by the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain. (Rec. Pg. 236). 
The Provo Municipal Council purportedly passed a resolution (2000-116) providing 
for the condemnation of the Spring Canyon's property on December 19, 2000. (Rec. Pg. 2) 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). Roughly eighteen months passed before Provo City took 
official action pursuant to this resolution. (Rec. Pg. 35). On or about June 10,2002, Provo 
City filed the underlying complaint to condemn property for a road that would connect 4525 
North Canyon Road in Provo City to 4800 North University Avenue through property not 
located within the boundaries of Provo City. (See Street Map of Provo. attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C"; Rec. Pg. 1-35) In its resolution, the Provo Municipal Council stated that the 
purpose of the connector road was to ease traffic congestion created by the Riverwoods 
shopping center and other businesses located on the west side of University Avenue. (Rec. 
Pg. 112&2). 
The December 19,2000, resolution approved condemnation of only a 2.093 acre strip 
of the Defendants' property. (Rec. Pg. 108). At the time of filing the Complaint, the city 
also filed a motion and memorandum for an Order of Immediate Occupancy pursuant to § 
78-34-9 Utah Code Ann. Provo City, however, petitioned the Court to condemn a 2.432 acre 
piece of the Defendants' property. (Rec. Pg. 30). Defendants filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy raising such discrepancy 
and the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. (Rec. Pg. 139). The Provo Municipal Counsel 
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then passed a second resolution (2002-042) on August 20, 2002, providing for the 
condemnation of the 2.432 acre strip of Defendants' property. (Rec. Pg. 165-16) (attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E"). The second resolution still stated that the purpose of the connector 
road was to ease traffic congestion created by the Riverwoods shopping center and other 
businesses located in the area. (See Resolution, attached hereto as Exhibit "E"; Rec. Pg. 162-
165). Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on August 28, 2002 to condemn the 
property at issue in this case. (Rec. Pg. 209). 
Although it will only create two lanes for automobile traffic, the proposed road's 
design constitutes 83 (eighty-three) feet of right of way, to flare to 93 (ninety-three) feet as 
it approaches the Canyon Road from the west. (Rec. Pg. 102-103). In addition to the two 
lanes, the proposed road has been designed to include a center lane, two bike paths, curb and 
gutter landscape strip, and a sidewalk.(Rec. Pg. 102-103). It will require raising the level of 
the land sought to be condemned by 6? as it approaches the brow of the benchland. 
In addition, part of the property Provo City seeks to condemn would not be used for 
the proposed road. (Rec. Pg. 97-101). Provo City had expressed its intention to take some 
property for the purpose of trading it with the owner of neighboring property. (Rec. Pg. 95-
97). The trial court, however, denied Plaintiffs motion to take that property. (See Ruling 
on Motion For Order of Immediate Occupancy f 6, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; Rec. Pg. 
334^6). The area for which immediate occupancy was denied is highlighted in green on the 
attached Exhibit "F". 
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Spring Canyons presently use the land for agricultural purposes and in the operation 
of a livestock business. (Rec. Pg. 334 & 322-304). The proposed road will sever Spring 
Canyon's property, leaving a parcel located in the northeast section of their existing property. 
(See Map of Spring Canyon's Land, attached hereto as Exhibit "F", Rec. Pg. 118; see also 
Highlighted Map attached as Exhibit "G"). This action will essentially destroy Spring 
Canyon's use of the land. The construction of the road will not allow Spring Canyon to use 
the remaining land in its livestock operation because the lambing operations would be 
disturbed by the proximity of a major road. 
The limited access road proposed by Provo City will leave Spring Canyon with an 
irregular parcel with less than 55 feet of frontage on the Canyon Road. Such parcel is shown 
on the attached Exhibit "G," (Rec. Pg. 193, pink highlighting has been added for illustration 
purposes) highlighted in pink to show the remainder. 
At hearing on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy, the court ruled that 
Article XI, § 5(b) granted Provo City the power to condemn land within or without its 
municipal boundaries for the purpose of providing public services and utilities to its 
residents. (See Exhibit "A" ^ 2; Rec. Pg. 335). Even though the proposed road is only 
intended to ease traffic congestion in the northeast quadrant of the city, the trial court 
determined that the proposed road constituted a "public utility." (See Exhibit "A" ^ 4; Rec. 
Pg.33 5). The trial court reached this strained conclusion by surmising that a road represented 
a "transportation facility" and equated that to a "public utility." (See Exhibit "A" j^ 5; Rec. 
6 
Pg. 335). Consequently, the trial court mled that Provo City was constitutionally endowed 
with the power to acquire the property at issue in this matter by means of condemnation 
beyond its municipal boundaries. (See Exhibit "A" fflf 4-6 ; Rec. Pg. 335-334). As such, the 
trial court granted Provo City's Motion for immediate Occupancy. (See Exhibit "A" ^ 10; 
Rec. Pg. 333). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Provo City is attempting to use its eminent domain power for the purpose of 
constructing a road for the accommodation and convenience of a growing population. The 
land Provo City seeks to condemn, however, is located outside the municipal boundaries of 
the city. As such, Provo City cannot condemn the land in question unless the power of 
extraterritorial condemnation has been granted to the city by express terms or clear 
implications. 
Provo City claims that Article XI, § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution grants it this power 
of extraterritorial condemnation. Article XI, § 5(b), grants a municipality the power: 
[t]o furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain 
and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property 
necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by general law 
for the protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility 
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise thereof. (Emphasis 
added). 
Thus, § 5(b) only grants eminent domain power "within or without the corporate 
limits" for the exclusive provision of "local public utilities." The condemnation clause 
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modifies the term "public utilities" and expressly grants a municipality the power of 
extraterritorial condemnation only for the purposes of operating, constructing, or leasing 
public utilities. Even as to "public utilities" the constitutional provision limits the power to 
"local in extent and use." A careful reading of Article XI § 5(b) shows that the term "for any 
such purposes" clarifies the prior term "public utilities local in extent and use" and sets the 
parameters for such extraterritorial authority. 
Article XI, § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution limits municipal eminent domain power 
to "make local improvements" to property located "within the corporate limits." This 
provision states that a municipality may: 
make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or 
otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such 
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than needed for any such 
improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in 
order to protect and preserve the improvement. (Emphasis added). 
Provo City seeks to condemn the land at issue to construct a road primarily for the 
accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants of a particular locality. Specifically, the 
purpose of the road is to ease the traffic congestion in the northeast quadrant of the city. 
(Rec. Pg. 226). As a result, the road constitutes a local public improvement. Thus, because 
the land at issue is located outside the municipal boundaries of Provo City, Article XI § 5(c) 
precludes Provo City from condemning Spring Canyons' land. Therefore, Spring Canyon 




L PROVO CITY HAS NO RIGHT TO CONDEMN THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE 
To prevail on a motion for immediate occupancy, a plaintiff in eminent domain 
proceedings must make "a showing, not only as to the necessity for a speedy occupation, but 
also a prima facie showing as to [the] right to condemn, if that right be controverted." Utah 
State Road Com'n v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821,833 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). In this case, 
Spring Canyon had consistently controverted the right to condemn. The Supreme Court of 
Utah has stated that "[t]he power of eminent domain is not to be exercised thoughtlessly or 
arbitrarily and the courts possess full authority to determine the proper limits of the power 
to prevent abuses in its exercise." CP Nat. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 638 
P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981). See also Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli. 567 P.2d 182, 183 
(Utah 1977). 
A. A Municipality, Such As Provo City, Does Not Possess the Power of 
Extra-Territorial Condemnation Unless That Power Has Been Expressly 
Delegated to It By the Legislature. 
Provo City does not have extraterritorial eminent domain power for the purpose of 
road construction and as such cannot make a prima facie showing of its right to condemn the 
Spring Canyons' property. The prima facie showing rule "requires the State to adduce some 
evidence to prove that it has fulfilled the necessary preconditions to the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain..." Friberg, 687 P.2d at 833. 
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It is undisputed that the land in question lies outside the municipal boundaries of 
Provo City. (Rec. Pg. 335, and 25). As a general rule, a municipality cannot condemn lands 
outside its corporate limits unless that power has been delegated by the legislature. See 4 
McOuillin on Corporations § 1495 (1921). "However, the power to condemn, unless 
expressly granted, must rest upon clear and unmistakable implication." McOuillin Mun. 
Corp. § 32.16 (3rd Ed.). So far as this writer has been able to determine, the Utah Supreme 
Court has only directly addressed the issue of extraterritorial power of condemnation twice. 
See Bertagnoli v.Baker, 215 P.2d 626,627 (Utah 1950); Great Salt Lake Authoritv v. Island 
Ranching Co., 421 P.2d 504 (Utah 1966). 
In the first case, the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
a municipal corporation cannot condemn land within the state but outside its 
corporate limits unless the power has been delegated by the legislature. When 
the power of eminent domain is given by statute, it is a well settled principle 
of law amply supported by cases from many jurisdictions in this country, that 
the extent to which the power may be exercised is limited to the express terms 
and clear implications of the statute. (Emphasis added). 
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 627 (Utah 1950) (citations and punctuation omitted). 
In Bertagnoli, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the Salt Lake City School District, 
a municipality, had no power to condemn land located partially beyond its corporate limits, 
even though the bulk of the parcel was within the school district's boundaries. Id. at 630. 
The Bertagnoli court was guided by the principle that "[t]he right of eminent domain, being 
in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed 
by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his 
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property." Id. at 628. Thus, the Bertagnoli court rejected the school district's broad assertion 
that courts have "permitted municipalities to condemn land outside their limits for proper 
municipal purposes when it has been necessary." Id. Instead, the Bertagnoli court found that 
extra-territorial eminent domain power was not implicit in statutes conferring on school 
boards general eminent domain power and the power to buy and sell property. Id. The 
Bertagnoli court determined that cases from other jurisdictions finding implicit extra-
territorial eminent domain power had dealt with express terms or clear implications—and 
were limited to utilities ("a culinary water system, a sewer system, or a hydro-electric power 
plant")—not present in the Bertagnoli case. Id. at 628-30. The case at bar is just another 
example of the erosion of individual property rights and the overreaching of local 
governments under the guise of the "public good." The end does not justify the means. 
In Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 421 P.2d 504 (Utah 1966), this 
Court relied on Bertagnoli to rule that a statutory scheme did not confer eminent domain 
power by express terms or implication. Id. at 505-6. In Island Ranching, the statute in 
question conferred on the Great Salt Lake Authority general eminent domain power—but 
provided other specific means for acquisition of property on Antelope Island ("donation, 
purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means as deemed necessary"). Id. at 505. Giving 
strict construction to the statute in question, the Island Ranching court ruled that the 
"legislature intended a manner of acquisition of Antelope Island other than eminent domain." 
Id. 
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Based on the rationale of the above cited cases, it is clear that if a statute or charter 
confers express power to condemn for a certain purpose, it must be construed as limited, 
insofar as authority to condemn is concerned, to the particular purpose designated. See 
McQuillinMun. Corp. §32.16 (3rd Ed.). Provo City's purpose to condemn this property that 
is located outside its municipal boundaries is to construct a road easing congestion in a 
particular portion of the city. Thus, Provo City must show that it has been granted the power 
of extraterritorial condemnation for the purposes of road construction by express terms or by 
clear implication. Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 627. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-8-2(l)(c) provides the manner by which the legislature 
intended municipal corporations to acquire property beyond its corporate limits. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 10-8-2(l)(c) provides that: "A city legislative body may: ... (c) purchase, receive, 
hold, sell, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the benefit of the city, 
whether the property is within or without the city's corporate boundaries." However, similar 
to the statute in Island Ranching, the listing of city powers of acquisition is notable for the 
absence of "eminent domain." Demonstrating that Provo City clearly lacks extra-territorial 
eminent domain power to acquire property outside its corporate boundaries. 
Additionally, the eminent domain laws expressly or implicitly related to road 
construction are similarly silent regarding extra-territorial eminent domain power. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-34-1 (3) (the general eminent domain provision for road construction); Utah 
Const. Art. XI, § 5(c) (eminent domain provision for "local public improvements"). As a 
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result, Provo City has no right to condemn Spring Canyon's property that lies outside the 
municipal boundaries of the city. 
Cases from the neighboring jurisdiction of Colorado provide further insight into the 
principles established by Bertagnoli and Island Ranching. In Mack v. Town of Craig. 191 
P. 101 (Colo. 1920), the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the town of Craig did not have 
the right to condemn part of a riverbank not located within its corporate limits. The Mack 
court ruled: 
The authority to condemn must be expressly given or necessarily implied. The 
exercise of the power being against common right, it cannot be implied or 
inferred from vague or doubtful language, but must be given in express terms 
or by necessary implication. *** As a rule, a municipal corporation cannot 
condemn property beyond its limits, unless authority to do so is expressly 
given. 
Id. at 101 (citation and punctuation omitted). Similar to Bertagnoli, the Mack court 
determined that statutes granting general power do not imply extra-territorial eminent domain 
power when it ruled that "[t]he bare right of the town to construct and maintain sewers can 
not be held to include the right to condemn property beyond its corporate limits in connection 
therewith." Id. at 102. City of Aurora v. Commerce Group Corp., 694 P.2d 382 (Colo. App. 
1984), also demonstrates how the rules governing extra-territorial eminent domain function. 
In Aurora, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that the City of Aurora had no express 
or implied authority to condemn fishing rights on a stream that was not located within its 
corporate limits. Id. at 384. The Aurora court determined that the rule requiring express or 
implied authorization to condemn brought with it "a presumption against implication of 
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authority for eminent domain not expressly granted by statute." Id. at 3 85. Thus, the Aurora 
court ruled that "[i]f an act is silent on the subject and the power granted can be exercised 
without resorting to condemnation, it is presumed that the [legislature] intended that the 
property be acquired by contract." Id. Applying these principles, the Aurora court proceeded 
to find that two statutes read together (one providing for acquisition of recreational facilities 
outside municipal corporate limits; one providing for acquisition of recreational facilities by 
eminent domain) did not confer express or implicit extra-territorial eminent domain power. 
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As a corollary, Utah statutes regarding the power of municipal corporations to vacate 
roads also demonstrate that Provo City has no extra-territorial eminent domain power for the 
purpose of road construction. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8.1 individuals may request 
that roads be vacated. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8.2, a city may vacate roads on its 
own initiative. The power to vacate roads granted in each of these statutes is limited to roads 
located "in [the] city." If the power to vacate roads is limited to the corporate limits of each 
city, it follows that the power to create roads through condemnation are also limited to the 
corporate limits of each city. If the trial court's ruling is upheld then the City is given the 
power to create a road in the county, but cannot vacate the road if it is no longer needed. 
14 
B. Article XI § 5(c) Forbids Provo City From Exercising Eminent Domain 
Power Because the Proposed Road is a Local Public Improvement, Not a 
Public Utility. 
To support its claim to extra-territorial condemnation powers, Provo City relies on an 
attenuated interpretation of Article XI, §5(b) of the Utah Constitution. Article XI, § 5(b) 
grants eminent domain power "within or without the corporate limits" exclusively for the 
provision of "local public utilities" and "local public services." In contrast, Article XI, § 
5(c) of the Utah Constitution limits municipal eminent domain power. It reads in pertinent 
part: "The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the following 
. . . (c) to make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, 
property within its corporate limits. . ." (Emphasis added). 
Unable to cite to "express terms" or "clear implications" to support its claim of 
extraterritorial condemnation powers, Provo City relies on a strained comparison between 
utilities and roads. Article XI, § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution grants eminent domain power 
"within or without the corporate limits" exclusively for the provision of "public utilities" and 
"public services." However, Bertagnoli, Island Ranching, and the accompanying cases 
require that extra-territorial eminent domain power be granted by "express terms" or "clear 
implications." Bertagnolu 215 P.2d at 627. Because Provo City cannot cite any statutory or 
constitutional provision that grants it extraterritorial eminent domain by "express terms," it 
argues that a road constitutes a public utility. 
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A local public improvement is an improvement which, although it may incidently 
benefit the public at large, is made primarily for the accommodation and convenience of the 
inhabitants of a particular locality. See 8 McQuillin on Corporations § 2027, p.7844 (1921). 
As McQuillin states: 
The fact that an improvement will be of advantage to the city does not change 
its character as a local improvement. If the improvement is primarily of 
material advantage to the adjacent property... as distinguished from benefits 
diffused by it throughout the municipality, it is a local improvement. 
(Emphasis added). 
See McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 38.11 (3rd Ed.) 
The proposed road is a local public improvement because its purpose is not to benefit 
the city generally. The main arteries the Provo's principal road, namely University Avenue, 
and Interstate 15 feed in elsewhere. (See Street Map of Provo, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B). The proposed road would connect 4800 N. To 4525 N., thus only alleviating the traffic 
congestion created by the businesses and residents in the northeastern quadrant of the city. 
(See Street Map of Provo, attached hereto as Exhibit "B; Resolution, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D"; Rec. Pg. 119-112). 
Conversely, a public utility provides a necessary service to the public, such as 
telephones, electricity, and water. See Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1544 (7th ed. 1999). 
Specifically, the term "public utility" is understood as referring to such things as steam and 
street railways, telegraph and telephones, waterworks, gasworks, electric light plants, cable 
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television systems, or other common carriers. Thus a mass transportation facility or common 
carrier, such as a street railway or an airport are defined as public utilities. 
A road, however, is not a mass transportation facility or a public utility, but rather a 
local improvement that, while incidentally benefitting the entire city, is constructed for the 
convenience and accommodation of a particular locality. Provo City is attempting to use its 
eminent domain power for the purpose of constructing a road for the accommodation and 
convenience of a growing population. As such, the road represents a local public 
improvement. Therefore, Article XI §5(c) limits Provo City's eminent domain power to 
"property within its corporate limits." 
Contrary to Provo City's assertions, a road is not a service or a utility. In assessing 
whether something is a local improvement or a public utility or service, a court must consider 
the character of the improvement, its situation, its surrounding conditions, and whether its 
primary purpose is to create a local or general benefit. See McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 38.11 
(3rd Ed.); see also Ruel v. Rapid City, 167N.W. 2d 541, 544(S.D. 1969). Additionally, even 
though a proposed improvement might directly benefit a problem of statewide concern, it will 
not be held to be a general improvement if its primary purpose is to solve or alleviate the 
problem of a particular locality. See In re Village of Hinsdale, Cook & Du Page Counties 
v. Lowenstine, 319 N.E. 2d 83 (111. App. 1974); McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 38.11 (3rd Ed.). 
According to the resolution passed by the Provo Municipal Council, the purpose of 
the proposed connector road is to ease traffic congestion created by the Riverwoods shopping 
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center and other businesses located on the west side of University Avenue. (See Exhibit "D"; 
Rec. Pg. 112 & 2). According to the resolution, the proposed road will ease traffic congestion 
only in that area. (See Exhibit "D"; Rec. Pg.l 12 & 2) The proposed road does not feed in 
Interstate 15 or any other main arteries of the city. (See Exhibit "C"). The proposed road 
would merely provide residents of the northeastern quadrant of the city more convenience 
and accommodation in accessing the businesses located near the Riverwoods Shopping 
Center. (See Exhibit "C"). Although the road in question may help to ease a traffic problem 
of citywide and even statewide concern, its primary purpose is to alleviate the problem of a 
particular locality. As such, the primary benefit is local in nature, the convenience and 
accommodation of those in the northeast quadrant of the city (Rec. Pg. 335). Therefore, the 
proposed road in question constitutes a local public improvement. 
The trial court's ruling is inconsistent with the policy implied by the interplay of 
Article XI § 5(b) and § 5(c). Based on these two provisions, it is obvious that municipalities 
may only condemn land outside their corporate boundaries for a limited and specific purpose, 
namely under Article XI § 5(b), the construction of public utilities. The provision grants 
power of extraterritorial condemnation for a certain purpose, the construction of public 
utilities, and as such must be construed as limited to that purpose. See McOuillin Mun. Corp. 
§ 38.11 (3rd Ed.)(emphasis added). Thus, because the purpose of the road is to provide a 
local benefit it is not a public utility, Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Construction does not 
apply in this case. 
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The trial court failed to limit the scope of Article XI § 5(b) to traditional public 
utilities, "such as a culinary water system, a sewer system, or a hydro-electric power plant," 
but rather extended this definition to include a road. See Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628 
(examples of traditional public utilities). As stated by Justice Wolfe: 
Upon examination of the cases cited by the School Board in support of this 
contention, we find that in all of them there was involved the construction of 
a statute or statues conferring upon municipalities the authority to condemn 
land for the purpose of constructing and maintaining either a culinary water 
system, a sewer system, or a hydro-electric power plant. In all of these cases 
the courts concluded that the authority to condemn land outside the boundaries 
of the municipalities could be clearly inferred since any other construction of 
the statute or statutes involved would render worthless or seriously impair the 
grant of power to condemn for the given purposes. 
The trial court determined that Provo City had extraterritorial powers of condemnation 
in this case because it erroneously concluded that a road constitutes a "transportation 
facility." (See Ruling If 5, Rec. Pg. 335). "Transpiration facilities," such as arailroad, a street 
railway or an airport are often classified as common carriers and thus public utilities. These 
transportation facilities have been classified as such by Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-
2-1. A road, however, is not classified as a "transportation facility" or a "public utility" 
under Utah law. Thus, the trial court did not construe the terms of Article XI § 5(b) as 
limited to a particular purpose, but rather expanded the definition of that purpose to include 
a road in this case. The trial court's ruling in expanding Article XI § 5(b) was incorrect. 
Provo City's eminent domain power to construct a road is governed by Article §5(c) 
and is limited to property located within its corporate boundaries. Provo City is attempting 
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to use its eminent domain power for the purpose of constructing a road for the 
accommodation and convenience of a growing population. As such, the road represents a 
local public improvement. Therefore, Article XI §5(c) should apply to limit Provo City's 
eminent domain power to "property within its corporate limits." As such, the trial court's 
interpretation of Article XI § 5(b), as applied to grant Provo City extra-territorial powers of 
condemnation in this action, renders Article XI § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution superfluous 
and unnecessary. 
The trial court's ruling is also inconsistent with the principle set forth in Bertagnoli 
v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626,627 (Utah 1950). The Bertagnoli court drew a distinction similar to 
that which should be drawn between sections 5(b) and 5(c) of Article XI of the Utah 
Constitution. In Bertagnoli, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that a municipal corporation, 
the Salt Lake City School Board, had no power to condemn land located partially beyond 
its corporate limits. See 215 P.2d at 630. The court stated the general rule that "a municipal 
corporation cannot condemn land within the state but outside its corporate limits unless the 
power has been delegated by the legislature." Id. at 628. The Bertagnoli court was guided 
by the principle that "[t]he right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of 
individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person 
will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property." Id. 
Although, the Bertagnoli court did not find any Utah cases on point, it determined that 
cases from other jurisdictions finding extra-territorial eminent domain power had dealt with 
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express terms or clear implications. Id. The assertion of extra-territorial eminent domain 
power in those cases was limited to public utilities, such as "a culinary water system, a sewer 
system, or a hydro-electric power plant." Id. The school board, however, was attempting to 
condemn land outside its corporate limits for the purpose of erecting a public school building 
in anticipation of future growth not unlike the claim of Provo City in this case. Id. at 627-28. 
The court held that the school building, while certainly a public benefit that was deemed 
necessary by the school district, did not constitute a public utility. Therefore, the court held 
that the school board did not have extra-territorial eminent domain power in that case. Id. 
at 630. 
The Provo City argues that extra-territorial powers are necessary for cities to "plan for 
the orderly flow of traffic in, out, and through their jurisdiction and allow for connections 
and alignments with existing streets in other jurisdictions." (Rec. Pg. 226). The Plaintiffs 
argument defies logical analysis. If this were the rale, then a city could use its eminent 
domain power to take land extending for miles outside its corporate limits. In the present 
matter, Provo City would be able to condemn land outside of its corporate boundaries that 
extended several miles up Provo Canyon as long as the purpose of the taking was to 
"construct a connecting road." 
The fact that the proposed road connects two existing roads within the city is not 
relevant to the analysis. If this were a valid reason to allow the use of eminent domina power 
outside a municipality's corporate boundaries, then municipalities would have a licences to 
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condemn land wherever they wanted. The condemned road could wander any place or 
distance as long as it connected back to a road within the city. Utah law, however, holds that 
a municipal corporation cannot condemn land outside its corporate limits unless that power 
has been expressly delegated to it by the legislature or the constitution. See Bertagnoli. 215 
P.2d at 627. As such, merely attempting to build a connecting road cannot justify an extra-
territorial application of eminent domain powers. 
Provo City has failed to show that it has been delegated the power of extraterritorial 
condemnation by "express terms" or "clear implication." Provo City's reliance on Article 
XI, § 5(b) is unwarranted in this case because the proposed road would primarily benefit a 
particular locality. As such, Article XI, § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution limits Provo City's 
condemnation power to lands located within its corporate boundaries. Thus, the trial court's 
order granting Provo City immediate occupancy of Spring Canyon's land that is located 
outside its corporate boundaries should be overturned. 
Provo City has historically recognized the limitations of Article XI § 5(c) when it has 
acquired properties in Provo Canyon for parks and recreation areas without condemnation. 
II. ALLOWING THE TRIAL COURT'S OPINION TO STAND WOULD 
EVISCERATE THE CURRENT LEGAL LIMITATIONS TO A 
MUNICIPALITY'S ABILITY TO SEIZE LAND LOCATED OUTSIDE ITS 
BOUNDARIES 
The interpretation of Article XI §§ 5(b) and 5(c) given by the trial court, vastly 
enhances a municipality's power to condemn land outside its corporate boundaries. The trial 
court has blurred the line between "local public improvements" and "public utilities" in such 
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a way as to allow municipalities to condemn land outside their corporate boundaries for any 
reason. Additionally, the trial court has eviscerated the meaning of Article XI, § 5(c), 
effectively merging it into § 5 (b) by allowing Provo City to condemn property located outside 
its municipal boundaries to construct a local public improvement. 
Under the trial court's holding, as long as some purported benefit to the general 
community exits, no matter how indirect or attenuated it may be, municipality can use its 
eminent domain power to take land located outside its corporate boundaries. This is contrary 
to the generally accepted rule that "the power to condemn, unless expressly granted, must rest 
upon clear and unmistakable implication." McOuillin Mun. Corp. § 32.16 (3rd Ed.) and 
specifically rejected by this court in Bertagnoli; supra. 
The consequences of this ruling are not isolated. Indeed, there are other cases pending 
that deal with the same issue. (See Highland attached as Exhibit "H"). If the trial court's 
ruling is affirmed, there is no doubt that cities will freely condemn land outside their 
corporate boundaries to improve their local infrastructure under the guise of constructing a 
"public utility" in anticipation of future growth. Consequently, municipalities will have 
unbridled power to condemn land wherever they want because surely any land acquired by 
a municipality will indirectly benefit the community at large, and thus classified as a public 
utility under the trial court's interpretation of the term. 
Additionally, several statutes that provide the cities with methods for acquiring land 
will be superceded and made moot by the trial court's interpretation. For example, Utah's 
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Annexation Statutes have a number of requirements that municipalities may be able to avoid 
under the trial court's ruling. See Utah Code Ann §§ 10-2-401 -10-2-422, et. al. Currently, 
an unincorporated area may not be annexed to a municipality unless the property owners file 
a petition and: 1) it is a contiguous area; 2) it is a contiguous municipality; and 3) annexation 
will not leave an unincorporated island or peninsula. (Unfortunately, this very circumstance 
was created in this case by Provo City through improper annexation). See Utah Code Ann 
§ 10-2-402. A petition for annexation must be filed and strict procedural guidelines must be 
complied with before a municipality can annex land located outside its boundaries. See Utah 
Code Ann §§ 10-2-403,10-2-414. Additionally, a feasability study must be conducted. See 
Utah Code Ann § 10-2-413. 
Interference with individual property rights is no light matter. The Constitution of 
Utah provides that "All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property." Ut. Const. Art. 1, § 1. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has stated that property rights are of "fundamental 
importance," (Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339,1345 (Utah 
1979) and "one of our fundamental and well-understood rights" (Rackley v. Fairview Care 
Centers. Inc., 23 P.3d 1022, 1031 (Utah 2001) (Durham, J. dissenting). Additionally, the 
Federal Constitution provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation." U.S. Const. 5th Am. Similarly, the Constitution of Utah provides: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
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Ut. Const. Art. 1, § 22. In the context of eminent domain, the Supreme Court of Utah also 
underscored the importance of property rights when it ruled that "Every landowner in this 
country has a right to resist with every legal means available the expropriation of his or her 
land. The right of eminent domain does not require docile passivity on the part of a 
landowner." Utah State Road Com'n v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821, 834 (Utah 1984). 
Contrary to this public policy in favor of individual property rights, the trial court's 
ruling in this matter allows a municipality to avoid and altogether skip annexation 
procedures, or any other procedure that protects an individual"s property rights, by simply 
condemning the land it seeks to possess under Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution. 
Because of the broad application of the term "public utility" that is inherent in the trial 
court's ruling, Article XI § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution no longer has any force to limit a 
municipality's expansion through condemnation. It would be bad public policy to encourage 
municipalities to expand beyond their borders by an interpretation of Article XT § 5(b) that 
allows extraterritorial powers of condemnation for any purpose deemed by the city council 
to be in the public good. 
Therefore, in order to avoid such chaotic results, this Court should abide by the 
generally accepted rule that the power of a municipality to condemn land located outside its 
corporate boundaries must be expressly granted or must rest upon clear and unmistakable 
implication." McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 32.16 (3rd Ed.). Thus, because the proposed road is 
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a local public improvement, Article XI § 5(b) does not give Provo City extraterritorial 
condemnation powers in this case and the trial court's order should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The framers of the Utah Constitution recognized the need for municipalities to have 
limited powers of condemnation beyond their city limits for the purpose of bringing water 
and power to the municipality and thus provided the limited authority set out in Article XI 
§ 5(b) for such purposes. Within their corporate boundaries the framers provided the broader 
authority set out in Article XI § 5(c). As such, Article XI, § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution 
limits Provo City's eminent domain power to property located within its corporate limits. 
Consequently, because Spring Canyon's land lies outside the corporate boundaries of Provo 
City, Spring Canyon respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order of 
granting Provo City immediate occupancy Spring Canyon's property and hold that 
condemnation is not available to take Spring Canyon's property. 
DATED and SIGNED this j ^ day of April, 2003. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the original Appellant's Brief was hand delivered to the Clerk of 
the Court, in the Utah Supreme Court and a copy mailed to the below named parties by 
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placing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, t h i s / day of April, 2002, 
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Mr. David C. Dixon 
Assistant Provo City Attorney 
351 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 1849 
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Mr. Harold A. Hintze 
Special Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAY J. IVIE, DEVON R. IVIE, 
KRISTINE J. LEE, EDWARD R. LEE 
and SPRING CANYON LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; CANYON ACRES 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; ROBERT 
LEE KENNER and KIRMA P. KENNER 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY 
Civil No. 020402430 
Judge: Anthony W. Schofield 
The Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy came on for hearing before the above 
entitled Court on November 6,2002, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the Plaintiffs being represented by David 
C. Dixon, Esq., and Harold A. Hintze, Esq., the Defendants KAY J. IVIE, DEVON R. IVIE, 
KRISTINE J. LEE, EDWARD R. LEE and SPRING CANYON LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and 
CANYON ACRES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP being represented by M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., the Court 
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2 RULING ON MOTION FOR ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
Page No. 2 
3 
4 having considered the proffers made, the briefs and arguments of Counsel and the stipulations by bott 
5 sides regarding the matter, now enters its findings and order as follows: 
g 1. The Plaintiff is a municipal corporation and as such has the power to condemn property both 
7 within and without its municipal boundaries for the purpose of providing public services and utilities 
g needed by its residents under and pursuant to the Utah Constitution, art XI, sec. 5(b). 
9 2. The subject property is not within the corporate boundaries of Provo City, but is part of an 
IQ unincorporated island surrounded by property within the corporate boundaries of Provo City, 
j j 3. Provo City has determined that it is reasonable and desirable to extend its existing public 
j 2 street by a connector road from University Ave eastward to Canyon Road, thereby providing a majoi 
13 additional traffic artery from the northeast quadrant of the City through the Defendants property (and 
j 4 others) and then connecting with 4800 North Street in Provo and onto Center Street in Orem and from 
15 there to the interstate freeway system. 
jg 4. In order to complete said proposed and planned extension of its street system, the Plaintiff 
17 needs to acquire the easements described in the Amended Complaint. 
I g 5. The Court determines that providing adequate and reasonable transportation facilities to, from 
19 and within its boundaries is one of the most basic "public services" or "public utilities" which 
20 municipalities generally provide, and therefore, Provo City is permitted to utilize its' constitutionally 
2i endowed power of eminent domain to acquire the property necessary to construct its proposed public 
22 s t r e e t 
23 6. The proposed construction of the connector street would sever the Defendants property 
24 leaving a parcel located in the northeast section of their existing property. Plaintiff included within 
25 its Amended Complaint a request to condemn that parcel on the theory that it was an "uneconomic 
26 remnant" and the conduct of the City effectively, if not literally, constituted such an interference with 
27 the use and utility of said severed parcel as to constitute a de facto "taking" thereof. Plaintiff has 
28 acknowledged that the "taking" of said severed parcel is not necessary to the accomplishment of the 
1 PROVO CITY v. KAY J. IVIE, et aL, 
Civil No. 020402430 
2 RULING ON MOTION FOR ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
Page No. 3 
3 
4 public purpose for which the other perpetual easements are sought (/. e., the 4800 North connection) and 
5 has offered to delete said severed parcel from the Amended Complaint should the Defendants desire. 
6 The Defendants have indicated their desire that said parcel not be included within the "take" and, 
7 accordingly, by mutual stipulation of the parties, said parcel is to be stricken from the description of the 
g property interests to be acquired herein by eminent domain. 
9 7. The remaining property is presently being used for agricultural purposes by Defendants and 
1Q has, associated therewith, livestock fencing, stock watering facilities, and irrigation and storm drainage 
11 facilities and improvements located thereon. Said fencing, stock watering facilities and irrigation and 
12 storm drainage facilities shall be maintained and/or if necessary replaced by Plaintiffs during the 
13 construction of the proposed road so as to provide the continued use and occupation of the remaining 
14 property by the Defendants for agricultural pursuits as in the "before" condition. 
15 8. The Plaintiff has had the subject property easements appraised by a state certified general real 
I g estate appraiser and said appraiser has determined that the fair market value of the easements sought to 
17 be acquired herein, including the severed parcel thought to be an "uneconomic remnant" and included 
j g within the Amended Complaint and appraisal, is the sum of $289,000. As a condition precedent to the 
19 efficacy of this Order of Immediate Occupancy the Plaintiff shall deposit said sum with the Clerk of the 
20 Court as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (2001). The Clerk is directed to place the money 
2i into an interest bearing account. Said sum may be withdrawn by Defendants subject to and upon the 
22 terms, provisions and conditions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (2001). Plaintiffs are not barred 
23 from seeking a refund or return of a portion of said deposited funds by virtue of the fact that the appraisal 
24 includes property now excluded from the "taking" by stipulation upon the request of Defendants. 
25 9. The Defendants have not required Plaintiff to produce any additional testimony or evidence 
26 regarding the necessity for the "taking," the reasons for a speedy and immediate occupancy of the 
27 premises, the relative equities of granting or denying occupancy pendente lite, or any and all other factors 
2g required and prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (2001), said Defendants acknowledging that 
1 1 PROVO CITY v. KAY J. IVIE, et. ai, 
Civil No. 020402430 
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Page No. 4 
3 " 
4 || all such factors exist justifying entry of an order of immediate occupancy other than their claim that the 
5 Plaintiff lacks extraterritorial condemnation powers to condemn their property for purposes of 
g construction of a public street. Defendants deny that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this action 
7 because the subject property is unincorporated and not within the boundaries of Provo City, 
g 10. The Court hereby grants the Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy. Provo 
9 City, its agents, employees, contractors and subcontractors may occupy, pendente lite, the subject 
10 easements described in the Amended Complaint for the purposes of constructing a public street and 
1 \ associated public improvements to be placed within the acquired easements. In addition Plaintiff is 
12 granted Immediate Occupancy of a temporary construction easement 10' in width along the southern 
13 portion of the now deleted "severed parcel" described herein, said temporary construction easement to 
14 expire consistent with and simultaneous with the other temporary construction easements described in 
15 the Amended Complaint and reasonably required to accomplish the street construction. Defendants, 
16 their agents and employees are enjoined from interfering in any way with the occupation of said 
17 easements by Provo City and/or the construction thereon of the public improvements for which the 
1 g easements are sought. 
19 11. The Defendants move for a stay of this Order for the purpose of filing a Petition for 
20 Interlocutory Appeal of this ruling. The Court grants this stay for a period not exceeding the 20 days 
2i provided by Rule 5a of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Any stay beyond that will have to be 
22 addressed by the Appellate Court. 
^u^\j( A 
23 J) Dated this \v day of November, 2002 
24
 M ^ 
HON. ANTHQNY W, 
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1 RESOLUTION 2000-116 
A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE INITIATION AND FILING OF A 
4 CONDEMNATION ACTION TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT 
5 DOMAIN IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A 
6 ROAD FROM 4525 NORTH AND PROVO CANYON ROAD TO 4800 NORTH 
7 AND UNIVERSITY AVENUE IN PROVO, UTAH. 
8 
9 WHEREAS, Provo City ("the City") desires to construct a road and bike path (the "Road") 
10 running from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North and connecting to University Avenue at 4800 
11 North; and, 
12 
13 WHEREAS, 4800 North Street runs west from University Avenue into Orem Center Street 
14 and is a major artery between Provo and Orem; and, 
15 
16 WHEREAS, 4800 North Street does not run east from University Avenue; and, 
17 
18 WHEREAS, this proposed Road has been shown on the Provo City Major Street Plan for 
19 many years and is shown as an arterial street; and, 
20 
21 WHEREAS, with new development and the increasing need for improved east-west traffic 
12 movement in the City, construction of this Road is a high priority for the City, and, 
W H E R E A S , the Riverwoods shopping center and other business buildings located on the 
£5 west side of University Avenue running north from 4800 North attract clientele that cause traffic 
16 congestion in the area; and, 
11 
>8 WHEREAS, a connector road between Provo Canyon Road and University Avenue would 
>9 ease traffic congestion on other roads in the area; and, 
\0 
11 WHEREAS, the City has contacted the owner of the property sought to be condemned and 
52 has negotiated with the owner and has offered to pay fair market value for land needed for the 
53 construction of this new Road; and, 
\4 
15 WHEREAS, the property owner has not agreed to sell to the City the land needed to 
S6 construct this new Road and the City must therefore acquire such land by eminent domain in order 
H to construct the proposed Road; and, 
.8 
»9 WHEREAS, the property to be acquired by eminent domain is described in the attached 
\0 Exhibit "A" which is incorporated into this resolution by this reference, and, 
H 
\2 WHEREAS, the property to be used as an easement during construction of the Road 
13 improvements as fully described in the attached Exhibit "B" which is incorporated into this 
'4 resolution by this reference; and, 
46 WHEREAS, on December 19, 2000 the Municipal Council held a duly noticed public 
^ hearing to receive public comment and ascertain the facts regarding this matter, which facts and 
J comments are found in the hearing record, and, 
49 
50 WHEREAS, after considering the facts and comments presented to the Municipal Council, 
51 the Council finds (i) that the construction of the proposed Road from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 
52 North to University Avenue at 4800 North constitutes a valid public use and (li) such action furthers 
53 the best interests of the citizens of Provo. 
54 
55 NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Provo Municipal Council as follows: 
56 
57 PART I: 
58 
59 1. The Mayor is authorized to initiate condemnation actions to acquire by the power of 
60 eminent domain the property described in the attached Exhibit "A" in furtherance of the construction 
61 of a new Road from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North to University Avenue at 4800 North. 
62 
63 2. The Mayor is authorized to initiate condemnation actions to acquire by the power of 
64 eminent domain, the easements described in the attached Exhibit "B" in furtherance of the 
65 construction of a new Road from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North to University Avenue at 4800 
66 North. 
67 
^ 3. The acquisition of the property described in the attached Exhibits "A" and "B" is for an 
^) authorized public use and necessary to the accomplish the purpose of construction of a new Road 
70 from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North to University Avenue at 4800 North. 
71 
72 4. The Mayor is further authorized, if needed following the initiation of condemnation 
73 proceedings, to obtain a court order to allow immediate occupancy, possession and use of the 
74 property or interests therein as set forth in the attached Exhibits "A" and "B". 
75 
16 5. The Mayor is further authorized to complete all necessary actions which are necessary and 
J7 proper to accomplish the purpose of this resolution. 
'8 
r9 PART H 
10 
I This resolution shall take effect immediately. 
2 
3 END OF RESOLUTION. 
Exhibit A 
4800 "North, Provo 
Descriptions for Perpetual Canal Easements 
PCE No. 1 
a perpetual casement, upon part of an entire tract of property, in die SW14SWW of Section 18, 
T.6 S., R.3 E., S.L.B.& M., in Utah County, Utah, for the purpose of relocating and maintaining 
an irrigation canal, incident to the construction of 4800 North Street. The boundaries of said part 
of an entire tract of land are described as follows: 
Beginning at a point in the westerly boundary line of said entire tract, which point is 
1600.04 feet S, 00o44,34" E. along the section line and 204.23 feet East from the West Quarter 
Corner of said Section 18; and running thence North 20.04 feet along said westerly boundary line 
and die extensiondiereof; thence N. 86° 17'00" E. 279.57 feet; thence N. 02° 11 '49° W. 4.56 feet 
to the southerly right of way line of said 4800 North Street; thence N. 87°48'11" E. 20.00 feet 
along said southerly right of way line; thenceS. 02°ir49" E. 24.04 feet; uienccS. 86°17'00" W. 
300.34 feet to the point of beginning. 
The above described part of an entire tract contains 6085.1 square feet. 
PCE No. 2 
a perpetual easement, upon part of an entire tract of property, in the SW tf SWW of Section 18, 
T.6 S.. R.3 E., S.L.B.& M., in Utah County, Utah, for the purpose of relocating and niamtaining 
an irrigation canal, incident to the construction of 4800 North Street. The boundaries of said part 
of an entire tract of land are described as follows: 
Beginning at a point in the northerly boundary line of said entire tract, which point is 
1407.35 feet S. 00°44'34" E. along the section line and 295.58 feet East fiom the West Quarter 
Corner of said Section 18; and running thence N. 89°08'30" E. 21.65 feet along said northerly 
boundary line; uience Southeasterly 100.10 feet along die arc of a 86.54-foot radius non-tangent 
curve to the left (Note: Chord to said curve bears S. 59D08,02H E. for a distance of 94.61 feet) 
to a point of tangency; thence N. 87043'53" E. 103.13 feet; thence S. 02D11'49" E. 20.13 feet 
to die northerly right of way line of said 4800 Norm Street; tiience along said northerly right of 
way line die following two (2) courses and distances: (1) S. 87°48' 11" W. 103.11 feet; thence (2) 
Northwesterly 132.43 feet along the arc of a 106.54-foot radius non-tangem curve to the right 
(Note: Chord to said curve bears N. 56D39' 16" W. for a distance of 124.07 feet) to the point of 
beginning. 
The above described part of an entire tract contains-4394.8 square feet. 
prepared by KPM 10/9/00 
cheeked by KRH 10/10/00 
Job No. 99-259 
10/03A)O 
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4800 North, Provo Job No. 99-259 
Description for R/W tnkc 10/02700 
A parcel Of land in fee, being part of an entire tract of property, situate in the SW lA SW U 
of Section 18, T.6 S.f R.3 EM S.L.B.& M. The boundaries of said parcel of land are described 
as follows; 
Beginning at a point in the easterly boundary line of said entire tract and the existing 
westerly right of way line of Provo Canyon Road, which point is 1433*38 feet S. 00*44*34" E. 
along the section line and 1203.00 East from the West Quarter Corner of said Section 18; and 
running thence S. 07*50*30" E. 124.30 feet along said easterly boundary line and westerly right 
of way line; thence N. 52d12'06M W, 23.92 feet; thence S. WWW W. 156.67 feet; thence 
N. 84°36'05tf W. 90.79 feet; thence S. &7*WW W. 604.60 feet to a point of curvature with a 
264.00-foot radius curve to the right; thence Westerly 190.93 feet along the arc of said curve 
(Note: Chord to said curve bears N. 71°28,41n W, for a distance of 186,80 feet) to the westerly 
boundary line of said entire tract; thence N. H*14'21" E. 96.09 feet along said westerly boundary 
line to the northwest corner of said entire tract; thence N. 89°08,30" E. 2.17 feet along the 
northerly boundary line of said entire tract; thence Southeasterly 137,89 feet along the arc of a 
183.00-foot radius non-tangent curve to the left (Note: Chord to said curve bears S 58°36'31" E. 
for a distance of 134.66 feet); thence N. S7°48'ir E. 884.36 feet; thence N. 42*06'14" E, 
15.82 feet to the point of beginning. 
The above described parcel of land contains 2.093 acres. 
prepared by KPM 10/9/00 
cheoked by KRH 10/10/00 
A:\0 IJlW.des.wpd Printed December 14.2000 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
1 RESOLUTION 2002-042 
2 
3 A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE INITIATION AND FILING OF A 
4 CONDEMNATION ACTION TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT 
5 DOMAIN IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A 
6 ROAD FROM 4525 NORTH AND PROVO CANYON ROAD TO 4800 NORTH 
7 AND UNIVERSITY AVENUE IN PROVO, UTAH. 
8 
9 WHEREAS, Provo City ("the City") desires to construct a road and bike path (the "Road") 
10 running from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North and connecting to University Avenue at 4800 
11 North; and, 
12 
13 WHEREAS, 4800 North Street runs west from University Avenue into Orem Center Street 
14 and is a major artery between Provo and Orem; and, 
15 
16 WHEREAS, 4800 North Street does not run east from University Avenue; and, 
17 
18 WHEREAS, this proposed Road has been shown on the Provo City Major Street Plan for 
19 many years and is shown as an arterial street; and, 
20 
21 WHEREAS, with new development and the increasing need for improved east-west traffic 
22 movement in the City, construction of this Road is a high priority for the City; and, 
23 
24 WHEREAS, the Riverwoods shopping center and other business buildings located on the west 
25 side of University Avenue running north from 4800 North attract clientele that cause traffic 
26 congestion in the area; and, 
27 
28 WHEREAS, a connector road between Provo Canyon Road and University Avenue would 
29 ease traffic congestion on other roads in the area; and, 
30 
31 WHEREAS, the City has contacted the owner of the property sought to be condemned and 
32 has negotiated with the owner for more than two years and has offered to pay fair market value for 
33 land needed for the construction of this new Road; and, 
34 
35 WHEREAS, the property owner has not agreed to sell to the City the land needed to 
36 construct this new Road and the City must therefore acquire such land by eminent domain in order 
37 to construct the proposed Road; and, 
38 
3 9 WHEREAS, the property needed for construction of the roadway belonging to Spring Canyon 
40 Limited Partnership, et al. to be acquired by eminent domain is described in the attached Exhibit "A" 
41 which is incorporated into this resolution by this reference; and, 
42 
43 WHEREAS, the property needed for the construction of the roadway belonging to Canyon 
44 Acres Limited Partnership to be acquired by eminent domain is described in the attached Exhibit "B" 
45 which is incorporated into this resolution by this reference; and, 
46 WHEREAS, the property needed for construction of the roadway belonging to Robert Lee 
47 and Kirma P. Kenner to be acquired by eminent domain is described in the attached Exhibit "C" which 
48 is incorporated into this resolution by this reference; and, 
49 
50 WHEREAS, on August 20, 2002 the Municipal Council held a duly noticed public hearing 
51 to receive public comment and ascertain the facts regarding this matter, which facts and comments 
52 are found in the hearing record; and, 
53 
54 WHEREAS, after considering the facts and comments presented to the Municipal Council, 
55 the Council finds (i) that the construction of the proposed Road from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 
56 North to University Avenue at 4800 North constitutes a valid public use and (ii) such action furthers 
57 the best interests of the citizens of Provo. 
58 




63 1. The Mayor is authorized to initiate condemnation actions to acquire by the power of 
64 eminent domain the property described in the attached Exhibits "A, B, & C" in furtherance of the 
65 construction of a new Road from Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North to University Avenue at 4800 
66 North. 
67 
68 2. The acquisition of the property described in the attached Exhibits "A, B & C" is for an 
69 authorized public use and necessary to accomplish the purpose of construction of a new Road from 
70 Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North to University Avenue at 4800 North. 
71 
72 4. The Mayor is further authorized, if needed, following the initiation of condemnation 
73 proceedings, to obtain a court order to allow immediate occupancy, possession and use of the 
74 property or interests therein as set forth in the attached Exhibits "A, B & C". 
75 
76 5. The Mayor is further authorized to complete all necessary actions which are necessary and 
77 proper to accomplish the purpose of this resolution. 
78 
79 PART II: 
80 
81 This resolution shall take effect immediately. 
EXHIBIT A 
4800 North, Provo Job No. 99-259 
R/WTake- Spring Canyon Limited Partnership (Parcel 1) September 21, 2001 
A parcel of land in fee, being part of an entire tract of property, situate in the SWV4SW&4 
of Section 18, T.6 S., R.3 E., S.L.B.& M. The boundaries of said parcel of land are described 
as follows: 
Beginning in the existing westerly right of way line of Provo Canyon Road at the northeast 
corner of said entire tract, which point is 1393.83 feet S. 00°44'34" E. along the section line 
(deed=21.44 chains south) and 1198.07 feet East (deed = 18.47 chains) from the West Quarter 
of said Section 18; and running thence S. 07o50*30" E. (deed=S. 6°40' E.) 164.21 feet along said 
westerly right of way line; thence N. 52o12'06" W. 23.92 feet; thence S. 87°48,HM W. 
159.25 feet; thence Westerly 154.79 feet along the arc of a 339.00-foot radius non-tangent curve 
to the right (Note: Chord to said curve bears N. 74°47,56u W. for a distance of 153.45 feet); 
thence Westerly 114.64 feet along the arc of a 266.00-foot radius non-tangent curve to the left 
(Note: Chord to said curve bears N. 78°30'43" W. for a distance of 113.75 feet); thence 
S. 89°08,30" W. 241.73 feet; thence S. 00°51,30n E. 11.22 feet; thence S. SQWSO" W. 
168.26 feet to the point of curvature of a 275.22-foot radius curve to the right; thence Westerly 
202.79 feet along the arc of said curve (Note: Chord to said curve bears N. 69°45,01" W. for a 
distance of 198.23 feet) to the westerly boundary line of said entire tract; thence N. l r U ^ r ' E . 
(deed = N. 12° E.) 25.40 feet to the northwest corner of said entire tract; thence N. 89°08'30" E. 
(deed = East) 1006.10 feet along the northerly boundary line of said entire tract to the point of 
beginning. The above described parcel of land contains 2.432 acres. 
prepared by KPM 9/21/01 
checked by KRH 9/24/01 
Printed March 1,2002 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
-00O00 
Hiqhland City, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Bull RJver Land Company, L.C., a 
Utah Limited Liability Company; 
Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company; North Utah 
County Water Conservancy District; 
an'd" "North "BertdFTTtrTRation Company, 




The petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory 
order, filed on January 21, 2003/ is granted. 
<L-2fP9l-
Date 
For The Court: 
Christine M, Durham 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on March 20, 2003, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
REG AGENT: CT CORPSYSTEM 
50 W BROADWAY 8TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY 
PRES JOHN K BUSHMAN 
680 W MAIN ST 
LEHI UT 84043 
JOHN H. JACOBS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
75 N CENTER 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003 
HAROLD A. HINTZE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 173 
FISH HAVEN ID 83287 
JONATHAN T. REID 
DANIEL P. VAN WOfiRKOM 
VAN WOERKOM REID & WEEKS LC 
2975 W EXECUTIVE PARKWAY STE 1 
LEHI UT 84043 
NORTH BENCH IRRIGATION COMPANY 
PRES SHERMAN R BRONSON 
590 E 3100 N 
LEHI UT 84043 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
FOURTH DISTRICT, PRQVO DEPT 
ATTN: MARILYN NEAL 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO UT 84603 
Deputy Clerk J 
Case No, 20030045-SC 
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, 020403745 
